INTRODUCTION
In Arizona v. Evans, 1 the United States Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply where an unlawful search is the result of a clerical error by a court employee. 2 The Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule did not fulfill its requisite deterrent purposes in a case where a police officer acted in good faith in response to a non-existent misdemeanor warrant appearing on the police computer. 3 Thus, the Court ruled that evidence seized in violation of Isaac Evans' Fourth Amendment rights could be admitted and used against Evans in a criminal proceeding. 4 According to the Court, the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to deter future Fourth Amendment violations by police officers. 5 Because the rule is not a specific remedy to cure Fourth Amendment violations, it is only applicable when the deterrent purposes are most efficaciously served. 6 This Note argues that the illegally seized evidence should have been excluded even though the violation was caused by a court employee. 7 First, this Note asserts that the Court distorted the precedent of United States v. Leon, 8 the common law foundation for the good faith exception, by ignoring the centrality of the warrant process in that case. Second, this Note asserts that, contrary to the majority's indication, the role of the exclusionary rule is much greater than mere deterrence. 9 Finally, this Note argues that even if the main goal of the exclusionary rule is deterrence, that goal would be better served by applying the rule to all state law enforcement personnel, not only to arresting officers. Therefore, the Court incorrectly held that the introduction of evidence against a criminal defendant, seized without a warrant or probable cause due to clerical error, was constitutionally permissible.
II. BACKGROUND
Basic Principles of the Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 10 While the language of the Fourth Amendment forbids unreasonable searches and seizures, it does not provide a mechanism for prevention or a remedy, should they occur." The exclusionary rule provides a means for enforcing the Fourth Amendment by "command [ing] that where evidence has been obtained in violation of the search and seizure protections guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, the illegally obtained evidence can not be used at the trial of a defendant." 12 The Supreme Court first announced the exclusionary rule in 1886, in Boyd v. United States.1 3 Boyd involved a quasi-criminal forfeiture proceeding.' 4 In Boyd, the Court concluded that compelling a defendant to produce private papers was equivalent to an unlawful search and seizure and therefore unconstitutional. 15 Justice Bradley authored the opinion which linked the Fourth and Fifth AmendCt. at 1195-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
10 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The full Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
Id.
1 For a discussion of whether the text of the Fourth Amendment mandates suppression of illegally seized evidence, compare STEPHEN SCHLsINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICF (1977) and Malcolm Richard Wilkey, The Exclusionavy Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidmce ?, 62 JUDICATURE 215 (1978) , with the words of Justice Brennan: "many of the Constitution's most vital imperatives are stated in general terms and the task of giving meaning to these precepts is therefore left to subsequentjudicial decisionmaking in the context of concrete cases." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 932 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For example, the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Thirteenth Amendments are stated in general terms, setting forth rights to be interpreted and given "meaning" through judicial interpretation.
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ments.' 6 Compelling the production of private papers essentially required the defendant to provide self-incriminating testimony, a clear Fifth Amendment violation.' 7 Thus, the Court noted that because police often engage in unreasonable searches or seizures in order to compel the defendant to give self-incriminating testimony, the admission of this evidence in court violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.' 8 In 1914, in Weeks v. United States,' 9 the Supreme Court first applied the exclusionary rule to criminal proceedings in federal courts. In Weeks, the Court held that a trial court could not use private documents, such as letters, which were seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as evidence in criminal proceedings. 2 0 The Court reasoned that it could not admit illegally obtained evidence without effectively condoning unconstitutional behavior, thereby compromising the integrity of the judiciary. 2 1 The Court did not mention deterrence as a goal supporting the exclusionary rule, but rather noted privacy interests, 22 the limitation of governmental power, 2 3 and the import of judicial integrity. 2 4 In 1961, in Mapp v. Ohio, 2 5 the Supreme Court held that the Constitution mandated the exclusionary rule as a remedy of a Fourth Amendment violation in state proceedings. 2 6 The Mapp Court examined the foundation of the precedent of Wolf, which came to the opposite conclusion, 2 7 and ultimately ruled that the exclusionary rule was an essential element of the guarantee of privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment, and was therefore required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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The Mapp Court specified three purposes served by the exclusionary rule: constitutional privilege, 2 9 judicial integrity, 30 and deterrence. 3 1 First, the Court stated that the exclusionary rule was a constitutionally required privilege and that the Fourth Amendment barred the use of illegally obtained evidence. 32 Second, the Court acknowledged that by admitting illegally obtained evidence, judges would extend Fourth Amendment violations to the courtroom. 3 Such a judicially sanctioned admission of illegal evidence would undermine public regard for the integrity of the judiciary. 3 4 Finally, by eliminating any incentive for the police to violate the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule would deter future police misconduct. 
Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule
Since Mapp, 3 6 the Supreme Court has repeatedly carved out exceptions to the exclusionary rule, systematically ignoring all but the deterrence rationale for the rule.
3 7 Presently, there exist the following exceptions: the impeachment exception, the independent source exception, the inevitable discovery exception, the good faith exception, the harmless error exception, and the rule of attenuation. 29 Id. at 656 (stating that allowing illegally seized evidence to be admitted into court would be "to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment"). 
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The Impeachment Exception
In Walder v. United States, 3 9 the Court established the "impeachment exception," allowing the Government to offer illegally seized evidence on cross examination of a criminal defendant to impeach the defendant who has perjured herself on direct. 40 The trial judge in Walder admitted evidence procured in violation of the Fourth Amendment to prove that a defendant, who testified that she had never possessed, purchased, or sold any narcotic drugs, was lying. 4 1 The Walder Court held that to disallow evidence in such a case would be a "perversion of the Fourth Amendment." 4 2 In other decisions, the Court has held that a criminal defendant, while possessing a Constitutional right to testify in her own defense, does not have a right to commit perjury, and evidence procured in violation of the Constitution is nonetheless admissible for impeachment purposes. 
The Independent Source Exception
In Wong Sun v. United States, 46 the Court established the "independent source" exception to the exclusionary rule. This exception inquires whether the evidence was discovered through an exploitation of the Fourth Amendment violation or through an independent source "sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." 4 7 If the evidence is not obtained directly from the violation, it is freed from the initial taint of the violation. 48 
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cally, this exception prevents the government from benefitting from misconduct, but avoids forcing the government into a worse position than had no misconduct occurred.
49
The Court extended the independent source exception in United States v. Segura, 50 which allowed the admission of evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Police officers had requested a warrant to enter a home, but did not wait for the warrant. 5 1 The state argued that had the police waited, they would have received the warrant and seized the evidence legally. 52 The Court found that this "potential" warrant provided them with an "independent source" for admitting the evidence. 
The Inevitable Discovery Exception
In 1984, the Court established the "inevitable discovery" exception in Nix v. Williams. 54 The "inevitable discovery" rule permits the admission of illegally seized evidence that would have inevitably been discovered through lawful means. 55 In enunciating this exception, the Court used a balancing test, weighing the deterrence goals of the exclusionary rule against the judicial interest in having the maximum amount of probative evidence available. 56 The Court concluded that the exclusion of illegal evidence that was inevitably discovered undermined the deterrent rationale of the exclusionary rule.
5 7 In such a situation, societal interest in judicial truth-finding outweighs any potential deterrent effects. 
The Good Faith Exception 5 9
The "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule was estab- 59 Despite the name, subjective good faith on the part of the officers alone is not enough to invoke the exception. The good faith belief must be objectively reasonable. The Leon Court itself cited circumstances in which behavior would be objectively unreasonable, and therefore subjective good faith would be irrelevant:
Suppression therefore remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the afflant knew was fUlse or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard for the truth.
The exception we recognize today will also not apply in cases where the issuing 64 Additionally, the purpose of the rule is to deter illegal acts specifically of the police; excluding evidence obtained by a police officer's good faith search which is illegal due to a judge's mistake would serve no such deterrent purposes. 65 Suppression would be appropriate, however, when the officer has no reasonable ground for believing that the warrant was legally issued.
66
The Leon Court considered three factors. First, the Court noted that the historical purpose of the exclusionary rule was "to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors ofjudges and magistrates." 67 Second, the Court asserted that no evidence suggested that judges or magistrates tend to ignore the Fourth Amendment, or that their behavior requires deterrent sanctions. 6 8 Third, the Court contended that the exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to such a warrant would not have a deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role.... Nor would an officer manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit 'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.' Finally, depending on the circumstances of the particular case, a warrant may be so facially deficient-i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized-that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) (citations omitted). See also People v. Machupa, 872 P.2d 114, 115 n.1 (Cal. 1994).
60 468 U.S. 897 (1984) . See also Massachusetts v. Shepard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (companion case to Leon; holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply when ajudge failed to make necessary clerical corrections to a defective warrant, resulting in an illegal search made by the police in good faith); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (holding that police reliance on a statute is objectively reasonable, and therefore exempt from the exclusionary rule, although the statute was ultimately found to be unconstitutional).
61 Leon, 468 U.S. at 900. The search warrant was later held to be invalid because the affidavit on which the warrant was based was insufficient to establish probable cause. 
The Harmless Error Exception 7 1
The Court established the harmless error exception in Chapman v. California. 7 2 The harmless error exception focuses on the factual determination of guilt rather than on peripheral and immaterial issues.
7 -Thus, evidence admitted in violation of the Fourth Amendment is subject to the doctrine of "harmless error." 74 The doctrine states that if admission of the evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction will stand. 75 Chapman dealt with murder convictions in a California court in which the defendants chose not to testify in their defense. 76 In closing argument, the prosecution commented at length on the defendants' failure to testify. 7 7 After the trials, but before the case reached the California Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court held that Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution, which provided that the prosecutor could comment on a defendant's failure to testify, was in violation of the Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination.
78
The California Supreme Court up-
71 This is not a true "exception" to the exclusionary rule. Rather, this rule governs reversal of convictions obtained through the use of illegally obtained evidence. Whenever illegally seized evidence is used in a trial, reversal is not automatic, but only upon a showing of prejudice. The harmless error doctrine as applied to federal constitutional provisions must be distinguished from non-constitutional error. Non-constitutional error is governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which provide "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
77
Id. At the time, Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution provided that "in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or thejury." CAL. CONST. of 1967 art. I § 13.
78 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965).
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held the conviction despite the Griffin decision, citing the California Constitution's harmless error provision. 79 In appealing to the United States Supreme Court, petitioners argued both that violations of the Griffin decision could never be considered harmless, and that, given the specific facts of this case, they were not harmless to petitioners. 80 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that (1) the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to create a harmless error rule; 8 1 (2) in order to hold a Constitutional error harmless, a court must find it harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; 8 2 and (3) given the specific facts of this case, the defendants prevailed by showing that the comments of the prosecutor reasonably could have contributed to the petitioners' convictions. 8 3 The harmless error doctrine effectively eliminates any potential remedy in the exclusionary rule to a Fourth Amendment violation when the prosecutor proves that admission of the illegally seized evidence is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Rule of Attenuation
Finally, the Court established the "rule of attenuation," in Nardone v. United States. 84 The rule of attenuation allows a court to admit illegally seized evidence when the Fourth Amendment violation is sufficiently far from the discovery of the evidence as to "dissipate the taint." 85 Either time or some intervening event can sufficiently separate the taint of a Fourth Amendment violation from the illegal procurement of evidence. n Brown v. Illinois 8 7 enumerated three factors relevant to the determination of whether the rule of attenuation applies: "(1) the length of time between the illegality and the seizure of evidence; (2) the presence of additional intervening factors; and (3) the degree and purpose of the official misconduct." 88 The Brown Court found that the rule of attenuation did not go so far as to dissipate the taint for the facts in this particular case because less than two hours separated the violation from the evidence, there was no intervening event of any insignificance whatsoever 9 and "the impropriety of the arrest was obvious. 
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III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
OnJanuary 5, 1991, Isaac Evans took a wrong turn onto a one-way street. 91 The wrong turn occurred in front of a Phoenix police station. 92 Officer Bryan Sargent and his partner were in front of the station and observed Evans' illegal activity. 9 3 Officer Sargent pulled Evans over and asked for his license. 94 Evans informed Sargent that his license had been suspended. 95 Officer Sargent entered Evans' name into a computer data terminal in his patrol car, which revealed an outstanding misdemeanor warrant for Evans' arrest. 96 Based on this warrant, Officer Sargent arrested Evans. 97 While being handcuffed, Evans dropped a cigarette which the officers determined smelled of marijuana. 98 Sargent searched Evans' car and found a bag of marijuana under the front passenger's seat. 99 Evans was charged with possession of marijuana, a class six felony. 10 0 When police notified the justice court of Evans' arrest, a court employee discovered that the arrest warrant had previously been quashed and so advised the police. 1 0 1
Evans filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized in conjunction with the January 5th arrest, claiming that he was a victim of an illegal search. 0 2 The state responded that the arresting officer acted on a good faith belief that a warrant existed, and that use of the evidence should be permitted pursuant to Arizona's good faith A. If a party in a criminal proceeding seeks to exclude evidence from the trier of fact because of the conduct of a peace officer in obtaining the evidence, the proponent of the evidence may urge that the peace officer's conduct was taken in a reasonable, good faith belief that the conduct was proper and that the evidence discovered should not be kept from the trier of fact if otherwise admissible. B. The trial court shall not suppress evidence which is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a peace officer as a result of a good faith mistake or technical violation. C. In this section: 1. "Good faith mistake" means a reasonable judgmental error concerning the existence of facts which if true would be sufficient to constitute probable cause.
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At the suppression hearing, the chief clerk of the justice court testified that on December 13, 1990, ajustice of the peace in Phoenix issued a warrant for Evans' arrest because he failed to appear on the previous day to respond to several traffic violations. 10 4 However, on December 19, Evans appeared before ajudge pro tempore who quashed the warrant. 10 5 Evans asserted that because his arrest and subsequent search were based on a warrant that had been quashed prior to the arrest, the court should exclude all seized evidence as a product of an illegal search and seizure.' 0 6
After testifying at the suppression hearing that Evans' outstanding warrant had been quashed prior to his arrest, the justice court clerk described the usual procedures for quashing a warrant. 1 07 First, a clerk at the justice court informs the warrant section of the sheriff's office that the warrant has been quashed.' 0 8 Then, a sheriffs office employee removes the warrant from the computer records.' 0 9 Finally, the justice court clerk makes a notation in the file indicating that he or she made such a phone call, and notes the name of the sheriff's office employee who received the information. 110 The chief clerk testified that Evans' file contained no indication that a clerk had called and notified the sheriffs office that Evans' arrest warrant had been quashed."' The records clerk from the sheriffs office also testified that her office had no record of a phone call informing them that the warrant had been quashed.
12
After hearing the clerks' testimonies, the trial court granted Evans' motion'to suppress, concluding that the State had been at fault for failing to properly quash the warrant.1 3 The court did not make a determination as to who was ultimately responsible for the continued presence of the quashed warrant in the police computer, 114 noting that there was no "distinction between State action, whether it hap-2. "Technical violation" means a reasonable good faith reliance upon: (a) A statute which is subsequently ruled unconstitutional. (b) A warrant which is later invalidated due to a good faith mistake. (c) A controlling court precedent which is later overruled, unless the court overruling the precedent orders the new precedent to be applied retroactively. The court reasoned that excluding evidence in such a case would not serve the exclusionary rule's primary purpose of deterrence: "the exclusionary rule [was] not intended to deterjustice court employees or Sheriff's Office employees who are not directly associated with the arresting officers or the arresting officers' police department."" 8 Evans then appealed to the Arizona Supreme Court, which reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the suppression the evidence." 9 The court found no "distinction drawn . . . between clerical errors committed by law enforcement personnel and similar mistakes by court employees." 120 A broad application of the exclusionary rule, the court stated, would "hopefully serve to improve the efficiency of those who keep records in [the] criminal justice system."' 2 ' Finally, the court focused on the broader implications for the exclusionary rule for individual freedom from government intrusion, stating that "it is repugnant to the principles of a free society that a person should ever be taken into police custody because of a computer error precipitated by government carelessness; ... under those circumstances, the exclusionary rule is a 'cost' we cannot afford to be without."
22
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence seized incident to an arrest warrant resulting from an inaccurate computer record, regardless of whether police or court personnel were responsible for the record's continued presence in the police computer. [when] a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with federal law, and when the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.
2
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Long standard was adopted for two reasons. First, it prevents the Supreme Court from requiring state courts to clarify the foundation for their decisions on remand.' 3 3 Second, this standard protects the integrity of federal law, while allowing states to develop independent jurisprudence free from federal involvement. 3 4 Responding to Justice Ginsburg's criticism that the Long standard limits the states' ability to create and implement unique jurisprudence, 3 5 Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that state courts are free to afford greater protection to individual rights under state constitutions than are provided by their federal counterpart, but when interpreting federal law, state courts must be subject to the Supreme Court's authority. 136 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Arizona Supreme Court's discussion of the exclusionary rule, absent a disclaimer that the Court was using federal law for guidance only, clearly subjected the decision to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. 137 
Substantive Analysis of the Exclusionary Rule
After determining that the Court had jurisdiction, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that suppression of evidence under the exclusionary rule is inappropriate when the Fourth Amendment violation results from a clerical error by a court employee, a sheriff's office emany title, right, privilege, or immunity is specifically set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United States. First, ChiefJustice Rehnquist argued that the exclusionary rule is ajudicially created remedy, whose purpose is to prevent future Fourth Amendment violations, rather than to provide an individual remedy.' 3 9 Because the language of the Fourth Amendment does not mandate the exclusionary rule, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that no connection exists between a Fourth Amendment violation and an individual's right to the suppression of evidence. 140 Second, citing United States v. Leon, 141 ChiefJustice Rehnquist asserted that the exclusionary rule should only be applied when its deterrent purpose is advanced. 142 Applying the Leon reasoning to the facts in Evans, ChiefJustice Rehnquist argued that excluding evidence improperly obtained due to a court clerk's departure from established office practices would serve no deterrent purposes. 143 Chief Justice Rehnquist maintained that, unlike police officers, court employees are not directly involved in law enforcement and have no personal or professional stake in the outcome of prosecutions.
4 4 Because the application of the exclusionary rule in the circumstances particular to Evans does not deter misconduct, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that suppression of evidence was an inappropriate remedy. 145
B. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE
Justice O'Connor' 4 6 wrote separately to underline her interpretation of the decision's limited scope. Justice O'Connor balanced the burden on law enforcement capabilities imposed by the exclusionary rule against the necessity for deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations. 14 7 Justice O'Connor emphasized the reasonable reliance standard as the basis for determining whether the exclusionary rule is applicable.' 48 Concluding that "with the benefits of more efficient law enforcement mechanisms comes the burden of corresponding constitutional responsibilities," Justice O'Connor left open the question as to whether the police officers' reliance on the record-keeping system First, Justice Stevens rejected the majority's assertion that the limited objective of the exclusionary rule is deterrence of police misconduct.
154
Throughout his opinion, Justice Stevens offered an alternative focus on the individual's freedom from unreasonable and arbitrary intrusion by any governmental entity, arguing that the suppression of illegally obtained evidence is the price "the sovereign" must pay for Fourth Amendment violations.' 55 Second, Justice Stevens concluded that even if deterrence were the sole rationale behind the exclusionary rule, the majority's holding was incorrect on the merits. 15 6 Justice Stevens rejected the Court's reliance on Leon, distinguishing a quashed warrant, one that no longer exists, from a presumptively valid warrant that is later overturned on appeal. Finally,Justice Stevens turned to the practical aspects of advanced technology and its invasive impact on the autonomy of innocent citizens, concluding that "the cost [of lower rates of criminal prosecutions] is amply offset by an appropriately jealous regard for maintaining the integrity of individual rights." ' 5 9
E. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S DISSENT
Writing in dissent, Justice Ginsburg 160 rejected the Long standard for determining whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over state court decisions. 1 6 ' Justice Ginsburg proposed the adoption of the opposite presumption, namely that "absent a plain statement to the contrary... a state court's decision of the kind here at issue rests on an independent state law ground."' 6 2 Justice Ginsburg maintained that this rule would free the states to act as "laboratories" in response to novel legal problems. 163 Therefore, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed.'6
Justice Ginsburg responded peripherally to the substantive issues by identifying the problems associated with increasingly invasive technology, discussing the artificiality of the distinction between court personnel and police officers, and recognizing that deterrence is an empirical question rather than a purely logical exercise.' 6 5 Justice Ginsburg proposed that the federal judiciary should allow state courts a freer rein to explore new ground and to protect individual rights against state infringement 66 V. ANALYSIS This Note argues that the Court erred in its substantive conclusion that courts should not apply the exclusionary rule when a court employee makes a clerical error resulting in a Fourth Amendment violation. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects the rights of all citizens against illegal searches and seizures by the govern- 1197-1203 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) . 166 Id. at 1201 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). ment.1 67 However, through the ever-increasing number of exceptions to the exclusionary rule, 168 the Court has narrowed Constitutional protections in privacy expectations, while expanding the authority of the sovereign to intrude into an individual's life.
In Evans, the Court furthered this erosion by expanding the good faith exception created in United States v. Leon. This Note asserts that the Court's decision in Evans is wrong for three reasons. First, by ignoring the factual underpinnings of the precedent in Leon, the Court disregarded the historical importance of judicial independence provided by the warrant process. Second, the Court focused on deterrence as the sole purpose advanced by the exclusionary rule, thereby underestimating the value of the rule for other non-deterrent purposes. Finally, the Court drew an illogical "bright line" by effectively limiting the deterrence possibilities of the exclusionary rule to arresting police officers. Therefore, the Court should have upheld the decision of the trial court to suppress the illegally seized evidence, as affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court.
A. EXTENDING THE LEON REASONING TO THE EVANS FACTS IGNORES ESSENTIAL FACTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO CASES
The exceptions to the exclusionary rule are of two general types: (1) those which recognize that evidence could have or did come from a source other than the Fourth Amendment violation; 1 69 and (2) those which recognize independent legal reasons for allowing the evidence. 170 The so-called "good faith exception" recognized in Leon is sui generis, a unique exception, based upon the independence of the judicial warrant. 171 Because no warrant existed at the time of the arrest in Evans, the Court misapplied the Leon holding. Although the facts of Leon and Evans appear similar, the difference in the bases for the illegal arrest in the two cases are fatal to the application of Leon's reasoning to Evans. 167 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
168 Current exceptions to the exclusionary rule are the following: the impeachment exception, the independent source exception, the inevitable discovery exception, the "good faith" exception, the harmless error exception, and the rule of attenuation. See supra notes 39-90 and accompanying text.
169 The independent source exception, the inevitable discovery exception, and the rule of attenuation all admit evidence because it either did or could have come from a source other than the violation. 170 The impeachment exception allows the illegally seized evidence to be admitted for independent legal significance, namely to impeach a wimess. The harmless error exception simply refuses to overturn a lower court decision when a reviewing court determines that the enforcement of constitutionally protected rights and attendant exclusion of evidence would not have made a difference.
171 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-18 (1984).
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In Leon, police officers conducted a legal search, acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate. 172 The warrant was later determined to be invalid. 173 In stark contrast, Evans' search and arrest was warrantless and without probable cause. The basis for Evans' arrest, the "phantom warrant," existed only in the police computer at the time of the illegal search and subsequent arrest. 17 4 The warrant had clearly been quashed'days earlier. 175 In Leon, there was a clear and legal authorization for the search. 17 6 When issued by a judge or magistrate, a warrant is presumptively valid until found to be invalid. 17 7 After the judicial decision issuing Leon's warrant, all judicial and law enforcement personnel fulfilled their respective responsibilities in effectuating the arrest. 178 In contrast, the search in Evans occurred because accountable non-judicial government employees failed to complete their required tasks. 179 The warrantless search and seizure were not the result of judicial error, but rather of a failure to effectuate a judicial mandate. 180 Although the factual difference between Leon and Evans may appear somewhat technical,' 8 ' the distinction is crucial. As Justice O'Connor stated in her dissent in Illinois v. Krull, 18 2 "Leon simply instructs courts that police officers may rely upon a facially valid search warrant." 1 8 3 What they may not do-at least prior to Evans-is make a warrantless arrest or conduct a warrantless search without probable cause in reliance on a mere report that a warrant exists. where a clerk, either ajudicial employee or in a police office, pulls an incorrect file; when a clerk types an incorrect license plate number into a computer; when one individual is mistakenly searched and arrested due to mistaken identity based on a shared name. What becomes clear through a consequentialist approach to Evans is that, after this case, only an arresting officer, a small piece of a much larger puzzle, has a clear incentive to be careful when it comes to the Fourth Amendment.
1996]
1219 SUPREME COURT REV[EW namely, judicial independence in the context of the court's warrantissuing function. 185 Traditionally, courts prefer that arrests be made pursuant to warrants issued by independent and unbiased magistrates, rather than police officers' determination of probable cause.' 8 6 Congress established a procedure whereby police officers seek a neutral judge's or magistrate's determination as to whether probable cause for a search or seizure exists. 187 The clear purpose served by this procedure for obtaining a warrant, as described in United States v. Chadwick, 188 is that it "provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, which is a more reliable safeguard against improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement officer 'engaged in the often competitive process of ferreting out crime." ' 9 The neutrality and reliability inherent in the warrant process, when compared to the police officer's determination of probable cause, create the presumption of validity of judicial warrants. 9 0
The Leon exception recognizes the importance of an independent determination of probable cause. 19 1 In this vein, the good faith exception promotes the use of the warrant process, as the exception provides police officers with an incentive for seeking a warrant through a judge. The police disfavor the warrant process due to the attendant time and energy requirements associated with going into court and presenting evidence to a judge, who may or may not find probable cause to exist. 192 However, the Leon exception provides that The reasoning which was critical to the decisions in those two cases [Leon and Sheppard]i-especially that in with-warrant cases there is no need to deter the magistrate and usually no need to discourage the executing officer from relying upon the magistrate's judgment and actions-does not carry over to the without warrant situation. Moreover, to extend Leon and Sheppard to such situations would deprive those decisions of their one clear incidental benefit: if good faith suffices only when the police had a warrant, then the exception would 'give law enforcement officers some solid encouragement to employ the warrant process for all searches and arrests which are not made on an emergency basis.' Id. § 1.3(g), at 94 (citation omitted).
186 The Supreme Court has noted the preference for warrants on many occasions. 
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[Vol. 86 a trial court will not exclude evidence on the basis of judicial error when a judge's error results in a Fourth Amendment violation. Police are thereby "rewarded" if they follow the warrant procedure; even if an appellate court reviewing the probable cause determination finds that probable cause did not, in fact, exist, police efforts are not wasted as evidence is nonetheless admitted in the trial court. 93 In contrast, when a police officer errs in determining that probable cause exists, the exclusionary rule prohibits any evidence seized in connection therewith from being admitted in court. ChiefJustice Rehnquist ignores the obvious analogy of the quashing of Evans' warrant to the initial issuance of Leon's warrant-both are presumptively valid because undertaken by a detached and neutral judicial official. Under Leon, the importance ofjudicial independence requires officers to accept on face value the validity ofjudicial determinations and rewards them for doing so by refusing to secondguess the reliance thereon. The Evans actors fail to carry out the judicial directive quashing the warrant. Contrary to Leon, however, they are subsequently "rewarded" through the admission of the illegally seized evidence, which ultimately resulted in a conviction. ChiefJustice Rehnquist ignores the obvious distinction: the Evans problem occurs due to post-judicial error, while the Leon problem is due to judicial error. This distinction is essential to the legal application of Leon to the Evans facts, as well as to a common sense understanding of the cases, after Leon's focus on judicial independence.
B. EVANS IGNORES HISTORIC FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES TO BE SERVED BY THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, INCLUDING LIMITATION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWER, PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY, AND PRESERVATION OF JUDICIAL INTEGRITY
Despite the contentions of the majority, the exclusionary rule's purposes reach beyond deterrence. 194 Other rationales, specifically the constraint on the sovereign, protection of individual privacy, and preservation of judicial integrity, were first introduced by Weeks and remain vital and relevant 95 despite the fact that deterrence appears 
1996]
to be the sole rationale cited in support of the exclusionary rule today. 196 First, the Fourth Amendment is "a constraint on the power of the sovereign, not merely on some of its agents. The remedy for its violation imposes costs on that sovereign, motivating it to train all of its personnel to avoid future violations.'
97 To give such a constraint some "teeth," and to provide this motivation, the Fourth Amendment must have a practical everyday meaning. 19 199 Court and sheriffs office employees whose jobs are the result of political patronage have a clear conflict between personal motivations to convict and compliance with the Fourth Amendment. Such an individual would have a vested interest in the outcome of criminal prosecutions when the elected official who appointed the employee is responsible to her electorate on issues of crime. In such a case, if the public feels that the elected official and her staff are not doing an adequate job prosecuting criminals, and the public does not reelect the official, the appointed employee loses her job.
200 See, e.g. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 390 ("Resistance to these practices [illegal searches and seizures] had established the principle which was enacted into the fundamental law in the Fourth Amendment, that a man's house was his castle and not to be invaded by any general authority to search and seize his goods and papers.").
201 Studies show that the actual societal cost of the exclusionary rule is relatively small. The third purpose of the exclusionary rule is to prevent the judiciary from engaging in behavior violative of the Constitution. 20 6 As discussed in Mapp, the admission of evidence seized pursuant to a constitutional violation implicates the judiciary in the illicit conduct of both the initial unlawful police activity and the secondary act of condoning such illegality through its admission in the trial court. 20 202 The obvious difficulty inherent in this argument is the fact that most individuals tangibly "harmed" by an illegal search or seizure are engaging in illegal behavior. Criminals benefit most directly from the exclusionary rule. In creating the rule, the judiciary weighed public policy interests in keeping criminals off the street against protecting innocent citizens from privacy violations. The clear effect of the exclusionary rule was known to all judges, and the response was clear "[ilt is better, so the Fourth Amendment teaches, that the guilty sometimes go free than that citizens be subject to easy arrest." Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959) . If, however, the purpose of the line of exclusionary rule decisions ending with Evans is to alter this calculus, placing greater weight on catching criminals, assuming we believe that the exclusionary rule is not constitutionally mandated, a more appropriate route would be to rethink the exclusionary rule as a remedy altogether, rather than chipping away at it through an ever-increasing number of exclusions. For a discussion of the benefits of eliminating the exclusionary rule, see The judicial integrity argument can, of course, cut the other way. The public often perceives such a "technicality" as the exclusionary rule as hampering the search forjustice and truth, rather than enhancing it, because truthful information is excluded on the basis of the means of its receipt. SeeStone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1975) (citation omitted).
207 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 ("Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence.").
In the final analysis, it makes no difference to the individual whose rights have been violated if the error resulting in the violation occurred at a police station or a state agency. 225 The maintenance of accurate and current information in government computers fundamentally preserves the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens. Even if the exclusionary rule alms primarily at deterring future police misconduct, courts could pursue this goal by extending the exclusionary rule beyond arresting police officers to include all police and non-judicial personnel engaged in law enforcement.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Arizona v. Evans, the Court concluded that admission of evidence seized incident to the execution of a non-existent arrest warrant as a result of a computer error was constitutional.
Evans was wrongly decided. The Court should have embraced a broad interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. First, the Court should have factually distinguished United States v. Leon due to its focus on the warrant process in concert with the fact that no warrant existed in Evans. Second, the Court failed to acknowledge motivations for the exclusionary rule other than deterrence, such as limiting governmental power, protecting individual privacy, and preserving the integrity of the judiciary. Finally, even if the exclusionary rule serves only deterrence purposes, the Court limited the rule's potential deterrence benefits by refusing to apply it to all governmental employees. Instead, the Court continues to chip away at the substance of essential Fourth Amendment protections against illegal searches and seizures. As a consequence of this decision, not only criminals, but also innocent citizens, will lose their Constitutionally guaranteed protections from unreasonable searches and seizures. HEATHER A. JACKSON ual, on the other hand, regardless of any and all attempts to avoid illegal searches and seizures, has no control whatsoever over the mistakes of government, be they mistakes of court employees or police officers. 225 The fact that one's Fourth Amendment rights were violated is not the dispositive issue, as judicial authorization "excuses" a violation by eliminating the exclusionary rule as a remedy. Unlike the judicial authorization context, however, there is no legal reason for distinguishing between the mistakes of an arresting officer and a clerical employee.
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